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[Crim. No. 10239.

In Bank.

Dee. 16, 1966.]

In re JAMES WIMBS on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Corpus-Evidence-Improper Plea of Guilt,..-In

a

proceeding in habeas corpus, averments as to involuntary
guilty pleas to charges of feloniously issuing checks without
sufficient funds in two counties did not raise a triable issue
of fact where it appeared from the court records that defendant entered a guilty plea in one county to issuing nine checks
totaling over $100 on the same day he was so charged, that
the court and public defender, at the time defendant was
granted probation, were not aware that he might be taken
to a second county for prosecution on other bad check charges,
that he was arraigned in the second county and volunteered
information as to his offenses, that he told the court he had
"told the whole thing" because he wanted to make restitution,
and, at the hearing for probation and sentence, he indicated
his inability to make restitution.
[2] Id.-Grounds for Relief-Judgment.-Habeas corpus is available to attack a judgment pronounced in violation of defendant's rights to appear and defend in person and with counsel
(Const., art. I, § 13).
[3] Criminal Law-Judgment-Amendment.-Where, after order..
ing that the sentence imposed on defendant should run con..
secutively with any other he might be serving, ~he court
directed entry of a "corrected" judgment for its sentence to
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 401; Am. Jur.2d, Criminal
Law, § 569.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 62.1(6); [2]
Habeas Corpus, § 34(1) (a); [3] Criminal Law, § 1034.
previously imposed to be placed into effect, the defendant has the right
to a separate appeal from the latter order as one "made after judgment,
affecting [his] substantial rights" (Pen. Code, § 1231, subd. 3), provided
that appeal is directed only to matters occurring in the post-judgment
commitment proceedings and does not raise issues which could have been
reviewed on a timely appeal from the suspended judgment itself.
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assip.
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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run concurrently, the purported "correction" was not of a
merely clerical error or inadvertence but an attempt, in excess
of the court's power, to revise its deliberately exercised
judicial discretion. The court was without power to thus
"correct" its sentence as pronounced and formally entered
in the minutes.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Order of superior court of one county purporting
to make its sentence run concurrently with the previously
imposed sentence of another county set aside with directions;
order to show cause discharged; writ denied.
James Wimbs, in pro. per., and Robert N. Beechinor, under
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petiti~ner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris,
Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Derald E. Granberg,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner is serving sentences based
on his pleas of guilty to three charges of feloniously issuing
checks without sufficient' funds. (Pen. Code, § 476a.) He
fraudulently issued nine checks for amounts totailingmore
than $100 in San Joaquin County in 1964 and two checks,
each for more than $100, in Stanislaus County in 1965. In
January 1966 he was arrested in Los Angeles County and
confessed to the offenses. In February 1966 he pleaded guilty
to the 1964 offense in the San Joaquin County Superior
Court, and that court suspended imposition of sentence and
granted him probation. In March 1966, on petitioner's plea
of guilty to the 1965 offenses, the Stanislaus County Superior
Court imposed concurrent sentences to the state prison. On
May 23, while petitioner was in the state prison under the
Stanislaus County sentences, the San Joaquin County Superior Court revoked probation and sentenced petitioner to
the state prison for the 1964 offense.
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds
that his guilty pleas were induced by misrepresentations,
threats, and promises precluding his exercise of free will and
judgment, and that the San Joaquin County Superior Court
imposed sentence in his absence and in violation of his right
to appear and defend in person and with counsel.
Habeas corpus proceedings have been invoked. to explore
contentions, similar to those of petitioner here, that a guilty
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pica was vitiated by the continuing coercive effect of an
illegally obtained cxtrajudicial confession (In re Poe (1966)
ante, p. 25 [51 Cal.Rptr. 896, 415 P.2d 784] ; In re Seiterle
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 651, 657 [39 Cal.Rptr. 716]), by misrepresentation and inadequacy of the public defender (In re Poe,
supra, ante, at pp. 32-35; In re Beaty (1966) 64 Cal.2d 760,
7G4 [51 Cal.Rptr. 521, 414 P.2d 817] ; In re Atchley (1957)
48 Cal.2d 408, 412-413 [310 P.2d 15]; In re Hough (1944)
24 Cal.2d 522 [150 P.2d 448]), and by threats and promises
as to punishment made by defense counsel and reiterated or
corroborated by the prosecuting attorney or the court (In
re Atchley, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 410, 414; In re Hough,
supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 527).
In petitioner's account of events leading to his pleas arid
sentences he charges the San Joaquin County public defender,
district attorney, and judge of the superior court with misrepresenting that confessions obtained from him in violation
of People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 [42 Cal. Rptr.
lG9, 398 P.2d 361], were proper evidence against petitioner,
and with threatening consecutive prison sentences if petitioner did not plead guilty and promising probation if hc
did. He charges similar misrepresentations, threats, and
promises by the Stanislaus County public defender and
district attorney. [1] Petitioner's version of events, summarized in the margin, l does not take into account the facts
1 Petitioner asserts that the following events led him to become "the
deluded instrument of his own conviction": He was arrested in Glendale
on January 28, 1966, pursuant to a warrant issued in Downey on a
forgery complaint. When he asked to telephone for bail and an attorney,
the arresting officer slapped him and toid him the Downey police would
let him telephone after he had made a statement. Neither the Glendale
police nor the other law enforcement officers through whose hands petitioner later passed informed him of his rights to counsel and to remain
silent under People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 [42 Cal.Rptr.
109, 398 P.2d 361]. Because petitioner had been slapped when he first
nsked to telephone an attorney, petitioner did not renew that request. The
Glendale police interrogated him for four hours, then turned him over to
the Downey police, who held him incommunicado for two days, questioned
him, and obtained his confession to the subject crimes. The Downey
charge was dropped on January 31 and on February 4 the Downey police
turned petitioner and his confession over to the Stockton police. The
Stockton officers took petitioner to San Joaquin County, held him in·
communicado for three days, "confronted" him with his earlier tape·
recorded confession made in Downey, interrogated him, and obtained
another confession to the subject crimes.
On February 26, 1966, petitioller appeared ill the San Joaquin County
Superior Court. There the public defender, the district attorney, and the
judge told him that bis confessions were evidence that could be used
against him, threatened him with consecutive prison sentences if he did
not plead guilty, and promised that if he pleaded guilty he would receive
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of record in the proceedings against him. The court records
not only show that the proceedings were regular on their face
but also refute the bases of petitioner's factual conclusion
that his pleas were the product of official misrepresentations,
threats, and promises ..
Thus, petitioner asserts that on February 26 he appeared
in the -San Joaquin County Superior Court and pleaded
guilty to six counts of violating section 476a after court and
counsel had ".confronted" him with his illegally obtained
confessions and made the claimed threats and promises.
Petitioner's assertions are confuted by the record showing
that on February 14 the district attorney filed the information charging one count of violating section 476a by issuance
of nine checks totalling $102.72 and on the same day petitioner personally stated, in response to questioning by the
court, that he was familiar with the allegations of the information and entered his guilty plea. The record further shows
·that on February 28, -when petitioner was granted probation,
the court and the public defender were not aware that
probation. Petitioner incorrectly states tllat on February 26 he pleaded
guilty to six counts of issuing checks without sufficient funds. Thereafter
the San Joaquin County Superior Court granted probation on condition
that petitioner make restitution.
On March 2, 1966, petitioner and his confessions were turned over to
law enforcement officers of Stanislaus County. They took him to Modesto
and repeated the process of holding him incommunicado for three days,
"confronting" him with his previous confessions, questioning him in
violation of Dorado, and obtaining another confession. The public defender and district attorney of Stanislaus County then induced petitioner
to plead guilty by misrepresenting that the confessions could be used in
evidence against him and by threats and false promises as to punishment.
The Stanislaus County Superior Court considered granting probation but
did not do so because petitioner was unable to make restitution.
On March 28, immediately after the Stanislaus County Superior Court
sentenced petitioner to concurrent terms in the state prison for his 1965
offenses, petitioner sent a letter from the Modesto jail to the superior
court judge before whom he had appeared in San Joaquin County, with
a copy to the San Joaquin County district attorney, stating, "You lied
to me. They didn't give me probation like you promised. . . . They told
me if I made restitution they would grant probation but I aill't got no
money and they said I had to go to prison.
"Are you going to continue me on probation' If you aren't then I
want to come to court because you people have done me wrong and I
want a lawyer."
On April 29, 1966, the San Joaquin County public defender wrote to
petitioner in the state prison advising that he was no longer eligible for
probation because of the prison sentence imposed in Stanislaus County
and requesting that petitioner allow the public defender to appear in
petitioner's absence for pronouncemcnt of sentence in San Joaquin County.
Thereafter, petitioner asserts, the San Joaquin County Superior Court
sentenced him in his absence in violation of his right "to appear and
defend, in person and with coullsel." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)
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petitioner was liable to be taken to Stanislaus County for
prosecution there. 2 Manifestly then petitioner is mistaken
in his assertion that his guilty plea was induced by statements
of the San Joaquin County Superior Court that led him to
believe he would receive probation in Stanislaus County.
Petitioner avers that on March 2 Stanislaus County authorities took him from San Joaquin County to Modesto and then
held him incommunicado for three days while unlawfully
eliciting another confession. This averment is disproved by
the record of the municipal court in Modesto showing that
petitioner was arraigned there on the Stanislaus County
complaint on March 3 at 9 :30 a.m.
At the proceedings in Stanislaus County,S both in the
2The probation report considered by the San Joaquin County Superior
Court on ]february 28 does not mention the charges in Stanislaus County.
It states that petitioner had admitted to the probation officer the truth
of the facts charged in the San Joaquin County information and recommends the granting of probation because of petitioner's "minimal prior
criminal record" (a minor traffie violation in California and a minor
game law violation in Oregon), his expressed remorse, and the fact that
apparently he would benefit from the supervision available on probation.
The judge commented that "defendant has a good reeord" and the
public defender replied that he did and joined in the recommendation
that he be granted probation.
The terms of probation make it obvious that the court contemplated-that petitioner, who was then without funds, would be released on probation so that he could obtain employment and make restitution as ordered,
not that he would be turned over to authorities of another county for
further prosecution. The probation order concluded, "The defendant will
be released after he has signed a copy of the terms of probation."
On March 1 petitioner signed a certificate that he had received and
familiarized himself with a copy of the probation order. On March 2 the
probation officer filed a supplemental report stating that he had inadvertently failed to state in his previous report that while petitioner was
in jail awaiting disposition of the San Joaquin County charge, warrants
were filed against him on charges of two violations of section 476a in
Stanislaus County and charges of violations of the same section in
Tehama County and Sacramento County. Petitioner was then turned over
to the Stanislaus County authorities.
On May 23 when the San Joaquin County Superior Court revoked
probation and imposed sentence the judge stated that he had not known
of the pending charges in other counties at the time probation was
granted and had first learned of them on Mareh 2.
SOn March 3, 1966, petitioner appeared in the municipal court in
Modesto, was informed of the complaint charging two violations of seetion
476a in Stanislaus County, and was advised of his rights. The proeeeding
continued as follows:
"THE COURT: . . . Do you want to be represented by a lawyer'
, , DEFENDANT: Your Honor, under interrogation I did admit to the
checks.
, 'THE COURT: Do you want to have a lawyer or not'
" DEi'ENDANT: Well, do you have my record there from Stoekton'
, , THE COURT : No, sir.
"DEFENDANT: Well, I was placed on probation.
"THE COURT: Just a moment. I don't know anything at all about that.
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municipal court and in the superior court, petitioner volunteered information as to his offenses in other counties. He told
the superior court, "\Vhen I surrendered I told the whole

)

All I know is that there will be a preliminary examination on this ease,
unless you are represented by counsel and enter a plea of guilty or you
waive the preliminary examination. • • • [Y) ou cannot do either of those
without being represented by a lawyer. • . .
"DEFENDANT: Well, then I would like to have an attorney..••
, 'THE OOURT: All right; the public defender is appointed."
On the afternoon of March 3 petitioner appeared in municipal court
with the public defender, pleaded guilty, and the matter was certified to
the superior court.
On March 10 petitioner appeared in the superior court. The court
reviewed the proceedings had in the municipal court and asked, "You
pleaded guilty to these two counts because you are guilty of those two
offenses' ' I Petitioner answered, "Yes." The court stated, "Defendant
stands convicted of a violation of Section 476a ••• in two counts, both
felonies, I I advised petitioner of his right to counsel, and asked, "you
want an attorney'
"THE DEFENDANT: May I ask, is it possible that I can save the County
money, because I have pleaded guilty, and I have received probation in
another county for the same thing. • • •
"THE COURT: What county,
, 'THE DEFENDANT: San Joaquin.
"THE COURT: And when did you receive probation there' •••
"THE DEFENDANT: 28th of February.
"THE COURT: 1966'
, , THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
, 'THE COURT: Now these checks, according to the complaint, were
written by you [in Stanislaus County] on the 28th of December, 1965.
, 'THE DEFENDANT : Yes.
"THE COURT: • • . I will want this matter referred to the Probation
.officer. Have you ever been in State Prison'
, 'THE DEFENDANT : No, I haven't. I also have two holds on me, one in
Sacramento and one in Tehama.
, 'THE COURT: Are these cheeks also t
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. When I surrendered I told the whole thing,
because I do want to make restitution.
, 'THE COURT: I will come back to it. • • • If you want the Public
Defender I will appoint him to represent you. If you don't, then of
course I won't make the appointment.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I would, Your Honor.
, 'THE COURT: Y ou will be appointed then, Mr. Stone, as the Public
Defender to represent the Defendant at all stages of the proceedings. I
assume that you want this matter referred to the Probation Officer for
investigation and report.
"MR. STONE: Yes, Your Honor.
The court fixed March 29 as the time for hearing on probation and
sentence. On that day petitioner appeared with Mr. Stone. The court
stated, "[T]he Probation Officer recommends against probation in this
matter, by reason of the fact that the Defendant has outstanding cheeks
in numerous counties and as a matter of fact in Oregon. . . •
"MR. STONE: I have discussed the matter with the Defendant. He advises me that the information set forth in the report is factually correct
[except for a few minor matters that were then corrected in open
eourt]. . .• .
"THE COURT: Mr. Wimbs, you've gotten yourself in a very difficult
position here. As a matter of fact you have restitution to make in the
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thing, because I do want to make restitution." Thereafter,
at the probation and sentellce hearing, the court stated,
" [Y] ou have restitution to make in the event of probation
that you will never be able to make. That's about the answer, "
and petitioner said, "That's about the answer." Sentence
was imposed and petitioner, having assumed in the Stanislaus
County Superior Court an attitude of frank disclosure, then
wrote to the San Joaquin County Superior Court the letter
quoted in footnote 1, stating, "You lied, to me. They didn't
give me probation like you promised." In the light of the
objective facts of record and of petitioner's misstatements as
to those facts, we do not believe that his averments that his
guilty pleas were involuntary raise a triable issue of fact.
[2] Habeas corpus is available also to attack a jUdgment
pronounced in violation of a defendant's rights "to appear
and defend" in person and with counsel" (CatConst., art.
I, § 13). (In"e Perez (1966) ante, pp. 224, 230 [53 Cal.
Rptr. 414, 418 P.2d 6].) Petitioner contends that the San
Joaquin County Superior Court's imposition of sentence on
May 23, 1966, while petitioner was confined in the state
prison, violated those rights. The Legislature, however, has
provided a procedure for pronouncement of judgment in the
absence of a defendant to whom the court has granted probation without imposition of sentence,: who is thereafter
. imprisoned under a commitment for another crime, and who
executes a written request, attested by a prison official, stating
that the defendant "wishes the court to impose sentence in
the case in which he was released on probation, in his absence
event of probation that you will never be able to make. That's about the
answer.
, 'THE DEFENDANT: That's about the answer. • • •
, 'THE COURT: • • • I will follow the recommendation of the Probation Officer. Probation is denied. Is there any statement you wish to
make ••• ,
"Ma. STONE: No. Your Honor. We will waive formal arraignment for
judgment. and there is no legal cause to show why the judgment and
sentence of the Court should not now be pronounced.
"THE COURT: • • • Is there any statement that you wish to mnke, Mr.
Wimbs'
, 'THE DEFENDANT: Does this here [the possibility of· charges from
other jurisdictions being pressed after delivery to the state prison] •••
include out of State also'
"THE COURT: That I don't know. • • • I suggest after you get to
Vacaville you might talk to some of the nuthorities up there and make a
determination there whnt course you are to assullle."
After pronouncing judgment of conviction on the two counts the court
stated. "Now you are going to have a lot of other things to face before
you are through. I am going to order these two counts to run concurrently. "
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and without his being represented by counseL" (Pen. Code,
§ 1203.28.)4 The San Joaquin County sentence of May 23
was imposed in compliance with section 1203.2a. I»
4Section 1203.23., as amended in 1963, provides in this regard: tt If
any defendant who has been released on probation is committed to a
prison in this State for another offense, the court which released him
on probation shall have jurisdiction to impose sentence, if no sentence
has previously been imposed for the offense for which he was granted
probation, in the absence of the defendant, on the request of the defendant made through his counsel, or by himself in writing, if such writing is
signed in the presence of the warden or superintendent of the prison in
which he is confined or the duly authorized representative of the warden
or superintendent, and such warden or superintendent or his representative attests both that the defendant has made and signed such request and
that he states that he wishes the court to impose sentence in the ease in
which he WM released on probation, in his absence and without his being
represented by counsel.
H The probation officer may, upon learning of such defendant's imprisonment, and must within 30 days after being notified in writing by
the defendant or his counsel, or the warden or superintendent. " , report
such commitment to the court which released him on probation.
" ••. If sentence has not been previously imposed and if the defendant
has requested the court through counselor in writing in the manner
herein provided to impose sentence in the case in which he was released
on probation in his absence and without the presence of counsel to represent him, the court shall impose sentence and issue its commitment, or
shall make other final order terminating its jurisdiction over the defendant in the case in which the order of probation was made .... If the ease
is one in which sentence has not previously been imposed, the court is
deprived of jurisdiction over defendant if it does not impose sentence
and issue its commitment or make other final order terminating its
jurisdiction over defendant in the CMe within 30 days after defendant
has. in the manner prescribed by this section. requested imposition of
sentence.
, , .•• In the event the probation officer fails to report such commitment
to the court or the court fails to impose sentence as herein provided, the
court shall be deprived thereafter of all jurisdiction it may have retained
in the granting of probation in said case."
GAs stated above, immediately after the Stanislaus County Superior
Court sentenced petitioner to the state prison he wrote to the San
Joaquin County Superior Court. "Are you going to continue me on
probation' If you aren't then I want to come to court because you
people have done me wrong and I want a lawyer."
After petitioner was delivered to the state prison the San Joaquin
County Public Defender wrote to him on April 29, 1966, stating that
"Since you are not now eligible for probation and your matter will be
brought before the Court here. it is requested that you allow this office
to appear without your presence for the purpose of having sentence
pronounced in this County. We are in hopes that upon the termination of
probation, the Court will sentence you to the State Prison to run concurrently with the sentence you are now serving."
On May 5, 1966, petitioner signed and the prison records officer attested
a request, directed to the San Joaquin County probation officer. stating,
"In accordance with Section 1203.2a of the Penal Code. I am requesting
that you advise the Superior Court of your county with respect to my
present commitment and that you request said court to effect disposition
of my probation in your county as required by the Penal Code Section
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[3] When the San Joaquin County Superior Court imposed sentence on May 23, it ordered that its sentence run
consecutively with any other sentence petitioner might be
serving. Thereafter on JUly 13, 1966, that court directed
entry of a "corrected" judgment ordering that its sentence
run concurrently. The court was without power to thus
"correct" its sentence as pronounced and formally entered
in the minutes. (In re Pedrini (1949) 33 Cal.2d 876, 879
[206 P.2d 699] ; People v. Behrmann (1949) 34 Ca1.2d 459,
462 [211 P.2d 575] ; People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 521
[342 P.2d 889].) As the Attorney General points out, the
purported "correction" was not of merely clerical error or
inadvertence but an attempt, in excess of the court's power,
to revise its deliberately exercised judicial discretion. 6 (See
also In re Sandel (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 412 [50 Cal.Rptr. 462,
412 P.2d 806].)
Petitioner, however, contends that the San Joaquin County
~uperior Court was without power to make its initial order
of May 23, 1966, that its sentence should run consecutively.
This argument, presented in propria persona, rests on
petitioner's misunderstanding of In re Nate (1965) 237
Cal.App.2d 809, 812 [47 Cal.Rptr. 457], and In re Roberts
(1953) 40Cal.2d 745, 749 [255 P.2d 782]. Neither of those
cases holds or suggests, as petitioner argues, that a court that
has withheld imposition of sentence and granted probation
is without power thereafter to make its sentence consecutive
to another sentence imposed while the defendant was on
probation.
noted above. I understand that I am not to appear personally or to have
representation by eounsel."
On May 12 the probation offieer filed with the San Joaquin County
Superior Court a report direeting the eourt's attention to petitioner'8
situation and his just quoted written request. On May 23 the matter of
the revoeation of petitioner's probation and imposition of sentenee eame
before the eourt. The publie defender appeared on petitioner's behalf
to request that the sentence run eoncurrently. The court, however, ordered
that the sentence run eonsecutively for the stated reason that" I see that
this [issuance of checks without sufficient funds] is an old habit of this
man-started out in 1964 before they caught up with him in February of
this year and apparently prior to that time, between the time of cashing
the cheeks in this County and the present time, he had three other
counties after him for the same offenses."
6Aecording to the Attorney General's points and authorities, the
senteneing judge advises that his initial order that the sentence run
conseeutively was based on his understanding that "petitioner's other
offenses had occurred subsequent to the granting of probation," and
when the judge learned that the other offenses had been committed
before the granting of probation "he directed entry of the corrected
judgment. "

The order of the San Joaquin County Superior Court purporting to make its sentence run concurrently with the
previously imposed sentence of the Stanislaus County Superior Court is set aside and the Adult Authority is directed
to consider the sentence as consecutive in accordance with
the judgment pronounced on May 23, 1966. The order to
show cause is discharged and the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Peek, J.,. concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied February 1, 1967.
.

